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Abstract 
This study investigates the associations between audit committee characteristics and the 
likelihood of auditors’ going-concern decisions among UK failed firms. Specifically, we 
examine whether the threat posed by auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) to auditors’ 
reporting decisions is mediated by audit committee characteristics. We find that failed firms 
with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) and financial experts 
on the audit committee are more likely to receive auditor going-concern modifications prior 
to failure, but that there is no significant relationship between NAS fees and the likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern modification. The evidence further suggests that the association 
between NAS and auditors’ reporting decisions is subject to audit committee characteristics. 
Where the audit committee is more independent and includes a greater proportion of financial 
experts, auditors providing the client with NAS are less likely to issue a standard unmodified 
going-concern report prior to failure. Overall, the findings provide support for corporate 
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governance regulators’ concerns about the monitoring benefits of audit committee 
independence and the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee for auditors’ 
reporting decisions. 
Keywords: Audit committee; Corporate governance; Non-audit services fees; Going-concern 
report; Corporate failure. 
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1. Introduction 
The study investigates associations between audit committee characteristics and the 
likelihood of auditor decisions to issue a modified going-concern report1
The research investigations carried out here are justified for a number of reasons. The 
audit committee, on the face of it, is positioned so as to impact on auditor reporting decisions. 
It is charged to review and monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity, the 
effectiveness of the audit process and the value of auditor-provided NAS. And the audit 
committee has the responsibility to make recommendations on the appointment, 
reappointment and removal of the external auditors (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). 
From the agency perspective, it has been assumed that the presence of independent directors 
and financial experts on the audit committee substantively enhances audit committee 
effectiveness in monitoring and controlling financial reporting and the external audit - as 
 in the context of 
UK failed firms. And in relation thereto we analyze whether reporting decisions made by 
auditors providing non-audit services (NAS) are mediated by those audit committee 
characteristics, thus investigating the combined effects of auditor-provided NAS and audit 
committee characteristics on auditor reporting decisions. 
                                                     
1Hereafter, we refer to a modified going-concern report as auditor reporting opinion in relation to the 
going-concern status of the entity including qualified opinions, adverse opinions, disclaimers for going-concern 
issues (International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 705) and unqualified opinions with an emphasis of matter 
paragraph highlighting the existence of material going-concern uncertainty (ISA 570). This array of 
modifications groups together reports differentiable in terms of auditor judgment about the pervasiveness of the 
effect, or possible effect, on the financial statements (see ISA 705). Nevertheless, all these modifications would 
typically indicate a negative view in respect of going-concern as compared to the standard going-concern 
assumption. 
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independent directors and financial experts are assumed to be personnel of high calibre with 
strong incentives to monitor the financial reporting process (e.g., Klein, 2002; Krishnan, 
2005). 
Theoretical perspectives on the impact of auditor-provided NAS lead to more of an open 
question as to whether and when auditor-provided NAS is likely to impair or improve auditor 
reporting decisions. The dominant perspective points to impairment as auditor-provided NAS 
are seen to potentially threaten and compromise auditor objectivity and independence: often 
the consulting nature of NAS places the auditors in roles where they work closely with 
management; the corresponding fees tend to increase the auditors’ economic ties with their 
audit clients (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002).2
                                                     
2 Such matters and considerations may at least create dilemmas for external auditors. The going-concern 
opinion can be a direct outcome of an auditor’s ostensibly professional decision, but translating this into a report 
may be understood to involve a negotiation of the auditor, management and audit committee. Many see the 
potential for tension here, particularly the possibility that corporate management may pressurize the auditor not 
to issue an unfavorable opinion, which could, e.g., impact on the share price (see Citron et al. 2008; Menon & 
Williams, 2010; Blay & Geiger, 2013). Such tension potentially puts at stake auditor income streams: while 
replacing auditors can attract to the company the negative attention of the market, there is documented evidence 
that auditors are more likely to be replaced after issuing a going-concern modification – indeed potentially the 
outcome can be the losses of benefits accruing to the auditor generated by all their work for the client, leaving 
aside other reputational effects (see Carcello & Neal, 2003). Further, for Sharma and Sidhu (2001), a firm facing 
impending failure has an enhanced need for NAS, giving the auditors further incentives to delay a 
going-concern modification. 
 An alternative view, relying 
on the knowledge spillover effect, points in a different direction: the provision of NAS is seen 
to give the auditors more in-depth understanding of their clients, which also benefits the audit 
(Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986). It is thus not so surprising that prior empirical studies have 
provided mixed results (e.g. DeFond et al., 2002; Basioudis, Papakonstantinou, & Geiger, 
2008).  
5 
 
Given that audit committees are charged with assessing the costs and benefits of 
auditor-provided NAS, and given that independent directors and financial experts have 
incentives to monitor and are more capable of overseeing the purchase of auditor-provided 
NAS, a further perspective of interest is that the influence of auditor-provided NAS on 
auditor reporting is potentially mediated by audit committee characteristics.  
Furthermore, prior empirical research in these areas is relatively scarce. Although a 
growing number of research papers have attempted to investigate the relationships between 
audit committee characteristics and managerial discretion in financial reporting (e.g., in terms 
of earnings management and the level of accounting disclosure), little is known regarding the 
effects of those characteristics on auditor reporting decisions. We therefore extend the 
existing corporate governance literature to address this issue in the context prior to failure. 
Some studies have examined the influence of the audit committee on auditor-provided NAS 
(e.g. Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011) but 
little is known about whether the inter-relationship affects auditor reporting decisions. Again, 
we extend the literature in this respect. 
We can also note here, providing further motivation for our study, the existence of 
continuing public policy debates in areas related to the focuses of this study.  There is the 
continuing concern of regulators, reported often in prior literature, about the majority of 
failed companies failing in the absence of a timely auditor opinion indicating going-concern 
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uncertainty (see House of Lords, 2011; The Sharman Inquiry, 2012).3A series of corporate 
failings over the last two decades has intensified regulatory concerns about auditor-provided 
NAS and audit committees’ responsibility in respect of monitoring this area.  An auditor’s 
going-concern modification in this respect is considered useful information to feed into 
company appraisal including in terms of appreciation of the increased likelihood or risk of 
impending corporate failure. The absence of a timely going-concern modification prior to 
corporate failure is often cited as evidence of audit failure and is often linked both to weak 
corporate governance and to auditor-provided NAS. Since auditors are charged with the 
responsibility to assess an entity’s going-concern risk and to identify events or conditions that 
may cast significant doubt on an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern (International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA) 570), the decision not to modify the going-concern assumption in 
the audit report issued immediately prior to failure raises eyebrows and motivates further 
reflection as part of an attempt to explore and assess auditing and corporate governance – 
including the role of the audit committee - in practice (The Sharman Inquiry, 2012).4
                                                     
3 For example, Citron and Taffler (1992) and this study report that only 26.2% and 34%, respectively, of UK 
failing firms had received an auditor’s modified report for going-concern uncertainties. Research has found that 
around one half of US bankrupt firms had received such a report (Mutchler et al., 1997; Feldmann & Read, 
2010). 
 To 
4 It should be noted that none should hold it reasonable to expect auditors to foresee all instances of failure. 
Likewise, a decision not to modify the going-concern assumption cannot be taken to guarantee company 
survival. There are dangers of resting upon or coming too close to such positions even among policy-makers and 
academics. More reasonable here, however, consistent with the substance of prior literature, is the position that 
auditors can potentially make decisions along a spectrum of reasonable, independent and expert decisions (or 
unreasonable and poor decisions) based on practices of varying degrees of reasonableness and expertise that 
influence the audit report’s usefulness vis-à-vis appreciations of corporate failure likelihood (see Defond et al., 
2002). Prior literature suggests the manifestation of corporate failure the more appropriate context for analysis 
of the determinants of and appraisal of the auditor’s going-concern report because within a year prior to failure 
the typical failing company shows relatively unambiguous financial distress symptoms that are more likely to 
have reached the threshold of going-concern uncertainty to merit modification (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; 
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address the concerns, corporate governance reformers have considered the audit committee as 
having a central role (e.g., Smith Report, 2003; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012).  
This study, focusing upon UK failed companies in a recent period - targeting the 
population of non-financial failed firms with an audit committee between 1997 and 2010 - 
yields interesting results. It is found that only 34% of the UK failed firms analyzed received 
auditor going-concern modifications for their last financial statements. The empirical findings 
indicate that failed firms with a higher proportion of independent NEDs and a higher 
proportion of financial experts on the audit committee are more likely to receive auditor 
going-concern modifications. The study found no significant relationship between 
auditor-provided NAS fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modification. 
Further evidence, however, indicates that the association between auditor-provided NAS and 
auditor reporting decisions is conditional on audit committee characteristics. The interaction 
terms between auditor-provided NAS fees and the percentages of independent NEDs and 
financial experts on the audit committee are positively related to the likelihood of a 
going-concern modification. This finding suggests that where the audit committee is more 
independent and includes a greater proportion of financial experts, auditors providing the 
client with NAS are less likely to issue an unmodified going-concern report prior to failure. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Citron & Taffler, 1992; see Sharma & Sidhu, 2001; Callaghan, Parkash, & Singhal, 2009). 
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This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. As indicated 
above, the paper’s attention to the effect of audit committee characteristics on audit reporting 
decisions in the context prior to failure has so far been scarcely researched. And, similarly, 
little is known about the joint effect of auditor-provided NAS and audit committee 
characteristics on auditor reporting decisions, which is also focused upon here. The study 
here hence addresses significant gaps in the literature.  
A further contribution is in the focus on the UK setting. Virtually all prior studies have 
been US-based, raising questions as to the generalizability to other environments. Further, 
while precise differences between the US and the UK in relevant regulatory systems and in 
their applications in their respective contexts is a matter of debate, involving as it does 
substantial complexity and critical interpretation, the UK setting is clearly different and 
dimensions of these differences appeal in relation to the focuses of this study (Hudaib & 
Cooke, 2005). The UK setting offers several advantages and potentially provides for new 
insights in respect of seeking to appraise the role of the audit committee and auditor-provided 
NAS with regard to audit reporting. UK companies, compared to US counterparts, arguably 
have relatively more flexibility to decide their audit committee structure to the extent that 
compliance with the applicable UK corporate governance code (UK Corporate Governance 
Code, 2012) is on a ‘comply or explain’ basis – whereby a company complies to various 
recommendations/provisions or provides explanations for what amounts to non-compliance 
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(Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 2010)5
                                                     
5 A flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance was adopted in the UK in preference to more 
prescriptive legislative regulation with the emergence of the Cadbury Code from the Cadbury Report of 1992. 
This basic approach was retained in various attempts to improve upon Cadbury - the Greenbury Code of 1995, 
the Combined Code of 1998 and now the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012. The approach, and hence 
currently the 2012 Code, has been appended into UK Stock Exchange Listing Rules from 1998 (see Arcot et al., 
2010). 
. For Arcot et al. (2010), there is an absence of a 
formal enforcement here - monitoring is in effect delegated to investors, market participants 
and public opinion. In addition, there is no blanket ban on NAS in the UK, where companies 
have freedom to choose their preferred source of advice and thus the audit committee may 
play a more important role in monitoring the purchase of NAS. There is a relevant standard 
of ethics but this is more in the nature of a guideline (APB Ethical Standard 5). Thus, while 
the UK approach is far from a free for all, and its commitment to a principles-based rather 
than a rules-based approach is potentially consistent with a highly sophisticated and 
appropriate regulatory functioning, this commitment arguably does usher in a relative degree 
of liberalism. That the environment of the UK is arguably in at least some respects more 
flexible than is the case in the US may thus enable us to examine how variations in audit 
committee composition and auditor-provided NAS and their combined effect impact upon 
audit reporting decisions. Further, the litigation environments of the UK and the US differ 
markedly (Hudaib & Cooke, 2005). These differences and the lower litigation risk in the UK, 
as compared to the situation in the US, may mediate audit practice (Seetharaman, Gul, & 
Lynn, 2002; Khurana & Raman, 2004). As discussed above, a going-concern opinion results 
from a negotiation involving the auditor, management and audit committee. Analysis of 
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indications of the effectiveness of audit committees with differing characteristics vis-à-vis 
auditor reporting decisions may be fruitful in a relatively liberal and less litigious 
environment. There are enough reasons here for finding the UK an interesting and important 
focus for analysis beyond the point that the analysis is an addition to the relatively few 
previous studies that have been mainly US based.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In the following section, we overview 
the prior literature concerning auditors’ going-concern decisions and develop our hypotheses. 
The sample selection procedure and research design are described in Section 3. The results 
are then presented and discussed. The final section draws conclusions. 
2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Background 
The going-concern assumption is an important one in the preparation of financial 
statements. The issue addressed in deciding upon the validity of the assumption is whether 
the entity will continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future (ISA, 570).6
                                                     
6 As defined by ISA 1, the normal time span for the auditor to consider the appropriateness of the going-concern 
assumption is typically at least 12 months from the end of the reporting period. 
 
According to ISA 570, auditors are responsible for assessing the going-concern status of their 
client and highlighting the existence of a material uncertainty regarding an entity’s ability to 
continue as a going concern in their audit reports. An auditor’s going-concern modification is 
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therefore recognized in the literature as at least an indicator of increased riskiness in relation 
to the continuity of a company (Levitan & Knoblett, 1985; Koh, 1991). Failure to issue a 
modified opinion in this context may affect the usefulness of financial statements (see 
Mutchler, Hopwood, & McKeown, 1997). 
The decision to issue a going-concern modification is regarded as one of the most difficult 
decisions for auditors (e.g., Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gomez-Aguilar, Fuentes-Barbera, & 
Garcia-Benau, 2004). In the negotiation process between auditors, top management and the 
audit committee (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991; Teoh, 1992), auditors may be confronted by 
significant pressure from client management, since the issuance of a going-concern 
modification may lead to serious negative effects on a company’s share price (e.g., Citron, 
Taffler, & Uang, 2008; Menon & Williams, 2010) and credit rating (Firth, 1980). In addition, 
auditors themselves are concerned about what they see as the possible economic 
consequences of issuing a going-concern modification when making continuity judgments 
(Kida, 1980): they may fear losing the client and the corresponding fees (e.g., Carcello & 
Neal, 2003). 
In order to manage any potential erosion of auditors’ reporting decisions engendered by 
inappropriate pressure from audit clients and/or the commercial interests of auditors 
themselves in the provision of services, corporate governance regulations/codes in several 
countries highlight the importance of the audit committee in the monitoring of the external 
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audit. No similar consensus has been reached, however, regarding whether to ban NAS. The 
UK corporate governance reformers are not fully persuaded that restricting auditor-provided 
NAS by outlawing these is necessary on the grounds that companies should have freedom to 
choose their preferred source of advice (see e.g., Cadbury, 1992; Smith Report, 2003). They 
develop recommendations aimed at mitigating the potential negative effect of NAS by 
strengthening the audit committee’s role in monitoring the purchase of such services and 
offering added assurance to the shareholders. 
2.2 Audit committee characteristics and going-concern reporting decisions 
In agency theory a series of mechanisms are proposed that seek to mitigate agency 
problems arising from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The role of the audit committee here is to ensure that the interests of shareholders are 
properly protected in relation to financial reporting. One of the prime tasks of the audit 
committee is to monitor and seek to ensure the objectivity and independence of external 
auditors, to mitigate management pressure on auditors, and to enhance the integrity of 
financial statements (Collier & Gregory, 1996; Pomeroy & Thornton, 2008; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Neal, 2009). According to the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999, p.7), the audit 
committee is the ‘ultimate monitor’ of the (financial reporting) process. 
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Corporate governance regulators are particularly concerned with audit committee 
independence (Cadbury, 1992; Smith Report, 2003; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012; 
Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 2012;). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) recommends that 
an audit committee be composed of a minimum of three independent directors. The 
theoretical support for the importance of independent directors is rooted in agency theory. 
According to this perspective, independent directors are free from economic interests or 
personal links with the managers of the company and are therefore better suited to exercising 
the monitoring task (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Additionally, independent directors have a 
stronger motivation to maintain the value of their reputational capital in the external labour 
market (Fama, 1980). Accordingly, they are deemed likely to play a more effective 
monitoring role and to have greater incentives to enhance the quality and transparency of 
financial information disclosed to shareholders (O'Sullivan, 2000). 
While serving on a part-time basis enhances independence and is hence in this respect part 
of the rationale for independent NEDs, it has also been pointed out that as independent 
directors serve on a part-time basis - and typically serve as directors on multiple boards7
                                                     
7 To ensure that directors are able to contribute sufficient time to the company, the UK governance codes 
recommend that a full time executive director should not take on more than one non-executive directorship in a 
FTSE 100 company nor be the chairman of such a company (Smith Report, 2003; UK Corporate Governance 
Code, 2012). 
 - 
they have limited contact with day-to-day corporate affairs and by dint of this are less likely 
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to allocate sufficient time to gaining firm-specific knowledge. This aspect may in itself limit 
the effectiveness of their monitoring duties (see Patton and Barker, 1987). 
Prior empirical studies primarily focus on the relationship between audit committee 
independence and managerial financial reporting decisions but provide mixed results. In the 
U.S., for example, Klein (2002), Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) and Dhaliwal, 
Naiker, and Navissi (2010) find that there is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
audit committee members who are independent and earnings management. Further, Abbott, 
Parker, and Peters (2004) find a negative relationship between the presence of a fully 
independent audit committee and the likelihood of restatements and financial fraud. Li, 
Mangena, and Pike (2012), however, find that the quality of intellectual capital disclosure is 
not associated with audit committee independence in the U.K. 
The existing literature on the association between audit committee independence and 
auditor reporting decisions is limited and virtually all U.S. based (Pomeroy & Thornton, 
2008). Carcello and Neal (2000) find that the presence of a greater proportion of independent 
directors on the audit committee is positively correlated with auditors’ reporting quality. 
Further, Carcello and Neal (2003) examine whether independent audit committees are more 
capable of exercising power over management and thus helping auditors to resist pressure 
from top management. They document that audit committees with high proportions of 
independent directors are more effective in shielding external auditors from dismissal after a 
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modified going-concern opinion is issued. The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012, 
considers that the presence of independent directors on the audit committee enhances 
effectiveness in monitoring audit quality. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification prior to failure is 
positively related to the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee. 
The presence of financial experts on the audit committee has become an area of key 
interest in recent research. Audit committee members are expected to manage to understand 
the complexities of financial reporting, evaluate subjective accounting policies, understand 
auditors’ decisions and appraise the quality of financial reports (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). 
Financial expertise is deemed crucial to an audit committee’s effectiveness because the 
committee needs to perform numerous duties that require a high level of financial/accounting 
sophistication (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005; Zaman et al., 2011). Financial experts are thus 
important for the fulfilling of those duties and protecting shareholders’ interests in relation to 
financial reporting quality (DeFond et al., 2005).  
Some recent studies explore the relationship between audit committee financial expertise 
and managerial reporting quality. Abbott et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between 
the presence of financial experts on audit committees and the incidence of financial 
restatements. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2010) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) further document 
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that audit committee financial expertise is positively associated with earnings quality. In the 
UK, Mangena and Pike (2005) report a positive relationship between audit committee 
financial expertise and the quality of interim disclosure. By contrast, Li et al. (2012) do not 
find a significant association between audit committee financial expertise and the quality of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Similar to audit committee independence, relatively little attention has been paid to the 
association between audit committee financial expertise and auditor reporting decisions. 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) argue that financial experts have better knowledge about the 
audit process and the auditor’s judgments. They find that financial experts on the audit 
committee are more likely to stand on the auditor’s side when there is a dispute between the 
auditor and management. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) also recognizes the 
importance of financial experts on audit committees and recommends that the audit 
committee should have at least one member with financial expertise. Accordingly, the second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification prior to failure is 
positively related to the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee. 
2.3 Auditor-provided NAS fees and auditor going-concern reporting decisions 
17 
 
The provision of NAS has continued to be the subject of the most heated debate in relation 
to auditor reporting quality. The theoretical frameworks predict a multi-dimensional and 
bi-directional relationship between auditor-provided NAS and auditors’ reporting quality. On 
the one hand, the provision of NAS reinforces economic bonds between auditors and clients. 
This may increase auditors’ incentives to accommodate client management in order to retain 
lucrative revenue from the client and thereby impair auditor independence and auditors’ 
reporting quality (DeFond et al., 2002). It is further argued that the provision of NAS 
alongside audit services increase an auditor’s financial dependence on the client, which gives 
client management a ground to pressurize the auditor to issue a favourable opinion 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Habib, 2012). In addition, the consulting nature of NAS is likely to place 
auditors in positions where they work closely with management, potentially reducing their 
maintaining of the integrity of auditor reporting (DeFond et al., 2002). 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the provision of NAS may strengthen audit 
quality. The provision of NAS can increase an auditor’s knowledge and understanding about 
its clients and thus enhance the audit (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986). Auditors are therefore 
more likely to detect and identify problems of a firm when simultaneously offering both NAS 
and audit services to a client. In addition, the provision of both NAS and audit services would 
increase the client’s dependence on its auditor’s services, which may reduce the threat of 
being replaced when there is a dispute between auditor and client management (DeAngelo, 
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1981). UK corporate governance reformers are not fully persuaded that imposing strict rules 
limiting NAS is necessary, since, as Cadbury (1992, para. 5.11) put it: “the prohibition (of 
NAS) would limit the freedom of companies to choose their sources of advice and could 
increase their costs”. 
 A number of empirical studies have examined the effects of NAS fees on financial 
reporting quality by measuring various proxies, such as earnings conservatism, discretionary 
accruals and the likelihood of restatements (Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002; Ferguson, 
Seow, & Young, 2004; Ruddock, Taylor, & Taylor, 2006), but the results are mixed. 
Inconclusive results are also found regarding the relationship between auditor-provided NAS 
and the likelihood of receiving going-concern opinions for poorly performing companies in 
both the U.S. and the U.K. (Lennox, 1999; DeFond et al., 2002; Basioudis et al., 2008; Blay 
& Geiger, 2013). Based on a sample of bankrupt firms, Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find a 
negative relationship between auditor-provided NAS fees and the likelihood of an auditor 
going-concern modification. The present research extends these studies by examining UK 
failed firms and hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification is negatively related 
to the level of NAS fees. 
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2.4 The interactive effect of audit committee characteristics and auditor-provided NAS on 
auditor going-concern reporting decisions 
As noted above, auditor-provided NAS may pose a threat to auditors’ reporting quality. 
Governance reforms therefore typically require that audit committees be responsible for 
reviewing and monitoring auditor-provided NAS fees paid to the auditor and evaluating 
whether the economic relation between the client and auditor appears to impair auditor 
judgment (Cadbury, 1992: para. 5.11; Combined Code, 2003: para. C 3.2; Smith Report, 
2003: para. 5.22; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). Although the audit committees are 
charged with these responsibilities, whether they are able to moderate the potential negative 
effect of auditor-provided NAS fees, and thus improve auditor reporting quality, has not been 
properly addressed in the literature. 
Since the audit committee is involved in the NAS purchase decision, its composition 
would influence the potential impact of auditor-provided NAS on auditors’ reporting quality. 
According to the agency perspective, independent directors are potentially tough monitors 
and are more likely to play an effective oversight role on an audit committee because they are 
free from financial and personal ties with the company and are concerned about their 
reputational capital in the market (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Accordingly, independent directors 
would act to avoid any conflict of interest arising from the closer business relationship 
associated with auditor-provided NAS. In addition, independent directors on the audit 
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committee may bear higher director liability and litigation risk once a financial misstatement 
occurs. Abbott et al. (2003) therefore argue that independent directors have strong incentives 
to scrutinise managerial decisions in respect of the purchase of NAS in order to reduce the 
potential threat to auditors’ reporting quality. 
Moreover, financial expertise on the audit committee is also likely to mediate the effect of 
NAS on auditors’ reporting quality. As previously discussed, financial experts are capable of 
understanding the complexity of financial issues and executing oversight in relation to the 
financial reporting process. Their professional knowledge enables them to monitor NAS and 
to evaluate the impact on auditors’ reporting quality. Audit committees with financial experts 
are more likely to disagree with managerial decisions on the purchase of NAS if such 
services would result in reduced auditor independence (Zaman et al., 2011). 
Literature investigating the role of the audit committee in relation to the purchase of NAS 
is limited. Gaynor, McDaniel, and Neal (2006) provide survey results and suggest that the 
audit committee would consider the effects of NAS on audit quality in determining whether 
to approve the purchase of NAS. The audit committee is more likely to approve NAS if a 
service is perceived to be beneficial to audit quality. Further, Abbott et al. (2003) and Zaman 
et al. (2011) empirically document a negative association between audit committee 
independence and auditor-provided NAS fees. Zaman et al. (2011) also find that these fees 
are negatively related to the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee. From the 
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above, and drawing on regulatory recommendations and the literature on audit committee 
structure and responsibility, we examine the combined effects of audit committee 
characteristics and auditor-provided NAS fees on auditor reporting quality and propose the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The relation between the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification 
and auditor-provided NAS fees is less pronounced when the failing company has a more 
independent audit committee. 
Hypothesis 4b: The relation between the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification 
and auditor-provided NAS fees is less pronounced when the failing company has a more 
financially expert audit committee. 
3. Sample selection and research design 
3.1 Sample selection 
This research investigates the relationship between audit committee independence, 
auditor-provided NAS fees and the likelihood of going-concern modifications prior to a 
corporate failure event. The empirical tests are based on a population of failed 
UK-incorporated, non-financial firms.8
                                                     
8 Companies in the financial sector were excluded because their financial structure is distinct from other 
companies and they are often subject to special rules and recommendations. 
 Failed firms are identified by investigating all quoted 
firms delisted from the Official List on the London Stock Exchange over the period 
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1997–2010.9 A firm is considered failed in this research if the reason for the cancellation of 
its listing was its entry into receivership, administration, or liquidation, consistent with the 
definition adopted by Peel and Peel (1988) and Neophytou and Molinero (2004).10
Application of the stated criteria yields a population of 124 firms that failed between the 
years of 1997 and 2010. However, because an audit committee was not established in all 124 
failed firms, the final sample is made up of 116 failed firms.
 
11
Going-concern opinion and corporate governance data used in this study were collected 
manually from the annual reports of the failed sample firms. Financial information was 
collected from the electronic resources of Datastream or FAME. 
 Table 1 presents the 
characteristics of the failed sample firms. Panel A presents the number of failures among the 
sample firms for each year from 1997 to 2010. Panel B presents the distribution of the 
industrial classifications of the 116 failed firms. 
 
 
                                                     
9 The lists of UK companies revoked from the Official List on The London Stock Exchange are obtained from 
Citytext or Hemscott Company Guru electronic resources. 
10 Firms were included in the sample if they were transferred from the Official List to the AIM (Alternative 
Investment Market) List and subsequently delisted from the AIM List between 1997 and 2010 without filing any 
annual accounts during their AIM listing periods. There are 14 firms in our final sample that were transferred 
from the Official List to the AIM List between 1997 and 2010. Those firms are considered as official listing 
firms in this study since they went into receivership, administration or liquidation immediately after moving 
onto the AIM list, and all of their filed information obtained is from during their official listing periods. 
11 We find in our UK-based study that relatively few large-scale companies have been subject to failure, 
consistent with the prior relevant study by Citron and Taffler (1992) that employed 107 failed companies 
between 1977 and 1986. Similarly, there were 89, 134, 134 and 92 failed companies in the relevant U.S. studies 
by Menon and Schwartz (1987), McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1991), Hopwood et al. (1994) and 
Callaghan et al. (2009), respectively. 
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3.2 Regression model and specifications 
This research employs logistic analysis to examine the study hypotheses, since the 
dependent variable, with categories of going-concern modifications or non-going-concern 
modifications, is dichotomous. The general models are developed as follows: 
GCM = β0 +β1AC_INEDi + β2EXPERTi + β3FEERATIOi + β4AC_SIZi + β5REPORTLAGi 
+ β6TENUREi +β7BIGNi + β8LnCOM_SIZi + β9COMPLEXi + β10LOSSi + β11LEVi 
+β12PRIORi + β13CRISISi + ei                                           (1) 
GCM = β0 +β1AC_INEDi + β2EXPERTi + β3FEERATIOi + β4FEERATIO*AC_NEDi + 
β5FEERATIO*AC_INEDi + β6FEERATIO*EXPERTi + β7AC_SIZi + 
β8REPORTLAGi + β9TENUREi + β10BIGNi + β11LnCOM_SIZi + β12COMPLEXi + 
β13LOSSi + β14LEVi +β15PRIORi + β16CRISISi + ei                       (2) 
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where, 
GCM = going-concern modification measured as a dummy variable, 
coded 1 if a modified going-concern opinion is issued, 0 
otherwise. The modified going-concern opinions include 
qualified opinions, adverse opinions, disclaimers for 
going-concern issues, and unqualified opinions with an 
emphasis of matter paragraph highlighting the presence of 
going-concern uncertainty; 
AC_INED = percentage of audit committee members who are independent 
NEDs; 
EXPERT = percentage of financial experts on the audit committee; 
FEERATIO = the ratio of total auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services 
fees; 
FEERATIO*AC_NED = interaction term between the ratio of total auditor-provided NAS 
fees to audit services fees and the percentage of audit committee 
members who are NEDs; 
FEERATIO*AC_INED = interaction term between the ratio of total auditor-provided NAS 
fees to audit services fees and the percentage of audit committee 
members who are independent NEDs; 
FEERATIO*EXPERT = interaction term between the ratio of total auditor-provided NAS 
fees to audit services fees and the percentage of financial 
experts on the audit committee; 
AC_SIZ = audit committee size: number of audit committee members; 
REPORTLAG = number of days between the year end and the audit report date; 
TENURE = length of auditor-client relationship in years; 
BIGN = dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company was audited 
by a Big 4/or 5 audit firm, 0 otherwise; 
LnCOM_SIZ = natural log of total assets (proxy for firm size); 
COMPLEX = percentage of foreign subsidiaries in total subsidiaries; 
LOSS = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company reported 
negative net income for the fiscal year, 0 otherwise; 
LEV = the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
PRIOR = dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company received a 
going-concern modification in the preceding year, 0 otherwise; 
CRISIS = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the last audit opinion date 
prior to failure was after 31 December 2007, 0 otherwise; 
β = parameters; 
ei = error term; and 
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i = the ith observation. 
For independent variables, we measure audit committee independence by the percentage 
of NEDs (AC_INED) on the audit committee who are independent. Independent NEDs are 
defined as NEDs with no financial or personal ties to the company or its management, as per 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012).12 We measure an audit committee’s competence 
in accounting and/or audit by the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee.13 
Financial expertise is important for the effectiveness of an audit committee because this 
committee is responsible for numerous duties that require a relatively high degree of 
accounting/audit sophistication in monitoring the financial reporting process (DeFond et al., 
2005).14
The interaction term between the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees 
and the percentage of independent NEDs on the audit committee (FEERATIO*AC_INED) is 
introduced to capture the effect of auditor-provided NAS fees on the likelihood of receiving a 
 We use the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees paid to the 
auditor (FEERATIO) to represent the relative use of auditor-provided NAS, and to capture 
regulatory concern over the possibility that auditors may lowball audit clients and recoup 
audit fee cuts through the provision of NAS (Firth, 1997; Smith Report, 2003).  
                                                     
12 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) sets precise criteria for independence on the basis of whether a 
director: (a) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; (b) has or had in the last 
three years a material business relationship with the company; (c) has received additional remuneration such as 
a performance-related payment and pension from the company apart from a director’s fee; (d) has close family 
ties with the company’s other directors, advisors, or senior employees; (e) holds cross-directorships; (f) 
represents a significant shareholder; or (g) has served on the board for more than nine years. 
13 Financial expertise is demonstrated by membership of a professional accounting and/or financial body or 
previous or current employment in accounting or finance (see Smith Report, 2003). 
14 The main role and responsibilities of the audit committee are set out in Provision C3.2 of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012) and Financial Services Authority, FSA, Disclosure and Transparency Rules 7.1. 
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going-concern modification when audit committee independence increases. The interaction 
term between the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees and the percentage 
of financial experts on the audit committee (FEERATIO*EXPERT) is introduced to capture 
the effect of auditor-provided NAS fees on the likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
modification when the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee increases. 
The control variables are drawn from the literature. First, audit committee size (AC_SIZ) 
is used to control for audit committee power (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993). Larger audit 
committees are more likely to behave as authoritative bodies exercising effective monitoring 
functions (Archambcault & DeZoort, 2001). Therefore, it is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between audit committee size and audit quality.  
Second, the time between the fiscal year-end and the audit report date (REPORTLAG) is 
included in the model to control for the timeliness of audit opinions. Prior research suggests 
that auditors may spend a longer time auditing troubled firms. It is found that companies 
receiving going-concern modification have longer reporting lags (DeFond et al., 2002). 
Third, auditor tenure (TENURE) is employed to control for the auditor-client relationship. 
Empirical evidence on the association between auditor tenure and financial reporting quality 
is mixed. It is suggested that auditors who have long served a particular client are more likely 
to possess client-specific knowledge and increase audit quality. Long tenure may, however, 
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increase the closeness of the auditor-client relationship and thus impair auditor independence 
(Johnson, Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002; Ghosh & Moon, 2005).  
Fourth, the presence of a Big 4/5 auditor (BIGN) is used to control for opinion-decision 
differences between the Big 4/5 and non-Big 4/5 audit firms. Prior literature suggests that 
large audit firms are more likely to issue a going-concern modification because they have 
more expertise and resources that allow them to exhibit better audit quality (Geiger & Rama, 
2006). In addition, the larger audit firms face higher reputation loss and litigation risk, which 
would lead to them being relatively more conservative in their reporting decisions compared 
to the smaller audit firms (Mutchler et al., 1997). 
Fifth, the natural log of total assets (LnCOM_SIZ) is used to control for firm size. Large 
companies may be less likely to fail. Studies have suggested that a larger client has a stronger 
negotiating power with its auditors. Auditors are reluctant to issue a going-concern 
modification to a large client due to the risk of losing the client’s significant business 
(Mutchler et al., 1997; Carcello & Neal, 2000). 
Sixth, we also include the percentage of foreign subsidiaries (COMPLEX) to capture 
business complexity. It is suggested that complex firms are more likely to receive modified 
audit opinions because higher business complexity could lead to more reporting errors and 
irregularities (Craswell et al., 2002). 
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Seventh, the presence of a prior year going-concern modification (PRIOR) is used as a 
control variable, since it has been suggested that firms that receive going-concern 
modifications in the current year are more likely to receive them in the subsequent year 
(Mutchler, 1985; Nogler, 1985). 
Finally, we control for the effect of the financial crisis in 2007 (CRISIS) on auditor 
reporting decisions. Auditors’ decisions are likely to have been more conservative in the 
period after the financial crisis because of higher intensive legislative and media scrutiny 
(The Sharman Inquiry, 2012). It is therefore expected that auditors are more likely to issue a 
going-concern modification after the financial crisis. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Of the failed firms, 39 received modified going-concern opinions for the last financial 
reports issued prior to failure, while 77 did not receive such opinions, suggesting that only 
34% of the failed firms received a going-concern modification preceding failure. This result 
is consistent with the finding of Citron and Taffler (1992), reporting that a large majority of 
the failed firms in the UK did not receive an auditor’s going-concern modification. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for failed firms receiving a modified going-concern 
opinion prior to failure compared to failed firms receiving a non-modified (clean) opinion 
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and provides the results of the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the continuous 
variables and the Chi-squared test for categorical variables. Among firms receiving 
going-concern modifications, on average, 76.50% of their audit committee members are 
independent NEDs (AC_INED). By contrast, only 64.63% of audit committee members are 
independent NEDs for firms receiving clean opinions. The difference is significant at the 5% 
level (T-test). This finding supports Hypothesis 1, which states that there is a positive 
association between the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee and the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern modification prior to failure. 
In addition, the mean percentages of financial experts on the audit committee (EXPERT) 
for the failed firms receiving a going-concern modification and firms receiving a clean 
opinion are 50.00% and 30.02%, respectively, and this difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The finding thus supports Hypothesis 2, i.e., the proportion of financial experts 
on the audit committee is positively related to the likelihood of receiving going-concern 
modifications prior to failure. Moreover, the result indicates that, on average, both groups of 
firms (i.e. the groups receiving modified and clean audit opinions) pay relatively more NAS 
fees than audit fees to their auditors. The mean values of the ratios of NAS fees to audit 
services fees (FEERATIO) for the failed firms that receive a going-concern modification and 
that receive a clean opinion are 1.72 and 1.87, respectively. This difference, however, is not 
statistically significant. The finding does not support Hypothesis 3, which states a positive 
30 
 
association between auditor-provided NAS fees and the likelihood of going-concern 
modification prior to failure. 
Regarding the control variables, the average audit committee size (AC_SIZ) values are 
2.62 and 2.83 for the failed firms receiving a going-concern modification and a clean opinion, 
respectively, and this difference is not statistically significant. In line with prior literature (e.g., 
DeFond et al., 2002), it is found that the companies receiving a going-concern modification, 
compared to those receiving a clean opinion, have a longer time lag between the fiscal 
year-end and the audit report date (REPORTLAG). In addition, there is no significant 
difference in both auditor tenure (TENURE) and audit firm size (BIGN) between the firms 
receiving a going-concern modification and a clean opinion. 
It appears that firms with larger size (COM_SIZ) are less likely to receive a going-concern 
modification prior to failure, but firm complexity (COMPLEX) is not significantly related to 
the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modification. Consistent with expectations, the 
firms with a loss (LOSS) and higher leverage level (LEV) are more likely to receive a 
going-concern modification prior to failure. Moreover, firms receiving a going-concern 
modification in the prior year (PRIOR) are more likely to receive a modified opinion in the 
report prior to failure. An auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern modification is not 
significantly related to the financial crisis (CRISIS). 
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4.2 Logistic regression analysis 
Because multicollinearity is considered as problematic in regression analysis, the 
Spearman rho correlations between variables are provided in Table 3, and the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are computed for each independent variable to examine whether 
multicollinearity is present. The correlations between independent variables included in the 
regression analysis are all less than 0.38. Multicollinearity in regression analysis is regarded 
as harmful only when correlations exceed 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition, the 
VIFs are below 2.1 for all independent variables employed in the regressions shown in Tables 
4 and 5, far lower than the critical value of 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007): this suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a major issue in the regression analyses. We also employ the link test 
to examine whether the logistic model is properly specified, and find that there is no 
significant specification error for the models shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4 presents results of the logistic regression models used to examine the relationships 
between audit committee characteristics, the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit 
services fees, and the likelihood of auditor going-concern modifications prior to failure. The 
overall models are significant, and the model Pseudo R2 is above 0.3425. The overall 
classification rates for the models are above 81.03%. Firstly, We examine the effect of 
independent NEDs on the audit committee on the auditor’s going-concern reporting decisions 
and reveal that the higher the percentage of independent NEDs on the audit committee 
(AC_INED) the more likely the auditor is to issue a going-concern modification prior to 
failure (p < 0.05). This suggests that an audit committee composed of more independent 
NEDs is more capable of safeguarding high audit reporting quality in the context of prior 
corporate failure. This finding is in line with the agency perspective and lends support to 
regulators’ emphasis on the importance of audit committee independence for reporting quality 
(e.g., Smith Report, 2003; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). 
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In addition, we investigate the relationship between the percentage of financial experts on 
the audit committee (EXPERT) and the auditor’s going-concern reporting decisions. The 
likelihood of receiving an auditor going-concern modification prior to failure is positively 
associated with the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee. This is consistent 
with the suggestion of DeZoort and Salterio (2001) and Hypothesis 2, and implies that more 
financial experts on the audit committee could improve auditor reporting quality. In line with 
some prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002), however, the ratio of auditor-provided NAS 
fees to audit services fees (FEERATIO) is not significantly related to the likelihood of a 
going-concern modification. This result does not support Hypothesis 3 that auditor-provided 
NAS impairs auditor reporting quality. 
With regard to the control variables, similar to the results generated from the univariate 
analysis, the time lag between the fiscal year-end and the audit report date (REPORTLAG) is 
positively related to the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification prior to failure. 
In addition, firms that had a loss (LOSS)15
                                                     
15 We also use return on assets as a proxy for a firm’s profitability. The results show that there is no significant 
relationship between return on assets and the likelihood of going-concern modifications, and the significance of 
the other variables substantively similar to that reported in the paper.  
 and received a going-concern modification in the 
prior year (PRIOR) are more likely to receive a going-concern modification in the report 
preceding failure. There is a weak positive relationship between a firm’s leverage level (LEV) 
and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modification. However, the variables of audit 
committee size (AC_SIZ), auditor tenure (TENURE), audit firm size (BIGN), company size 
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(LnCOM_SIZ), firm complexity (COMPLEX) and financial crisis (CRISIS) are not 
significantly associated with the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification prior to 
failure. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We further analyze whether audit committee independence and financial expertise has 
mediated the relationship between auditor reporting decisions prior to failure and 
auditor-provided NAS fees. To test the mediating effects of audit committee characteristics 
on the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification, we introduce interaction terms 
between the percentages of independent NEDs (AC_INED) and financial experts (EXPERT) 
on the audit committee, and the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees 
(FEERATIO). To avoid multicollinearity between the interaction terms and their constituent 
variables, we mean-centre AC_INED and EXPERT, and FEERATIO before adding them to 
the regression models (see Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013). 
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Table 5 sets forth the results for the interactive effects of the audit committee 
characteristics and FEERATIO on the likelihood of auditors issuing a going-concern 
modification. Panel A of Table 5 reports the logistic results for the effects of the interaction 
terms between the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees and the 
percentage of independent NEDs on the audit committee (FEERATIO*AC_INED) (Model 
(1)), and the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee (FEERATIO*EXPERT) 
(Model (2)). Significantly positive coefficients on those interactions indicate that increases in 
the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees (FEERATIO) are associated with 
the higher likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification as the percentages of 
independent NEDs (AC_INED) and financial experts (EXPERT) on the audit committee 
increase. 
Panel B of Table 5 further reports how the impact of FEERATIO on the likelihood of an 
auditor going-concern modification varies with different values of the audit committee 
characteristics. The results demonstrate that FEERATIO is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification as there are 50% and 66.67% of 
independent NEDs on the audit committee (i.e. at the 25% and 50% percentiles of the sample 
distribution of AC_INED, respectively). By contrast, there is no significant association 
between FEERATIO and the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification when the 
audit committee is fully composed of independent NEDs (i.e. at the 75% percentile of the 
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sample distribution of AC_INED). The findings suggest that the presence of a highly 
independent audit committee may moderate the potential threat posed by NAS to audit 
reporting quality. 
In addition, it is found that FEERATIO is negatively related to the likelihood of an auditor 
going-concern modification when there is no financial expert and when the proportion of 
members of the audit committee who are financial experts is at 33.33% (i.e. at the 25% and 
50% percentiles of the sample distribution of EXPERT, respectively). The relationship 
between the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee and the likelihood of a 
going-concern modification becomes insignificant when the proportion of members on the 
audit committee who are financial experts reaches 50% (i.e. at the 75% percentile of the 
sample distribution of EXPERT). The result also reflects the importance of the financial 
expertise of the audit committee in mitigating the potential negative effect of NAS on auditor 
reporting quality. Overall, the findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 that the relation 
between the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification and auditor-provided NAS 
is subject to audit committee characteristics, implying that the purchase of NAS is less likely 
to result in an unfavorable impact on auditors’ going-concern reporting decisions prior to 
failure when the failed firms have a more independent audit committee or has a more 
financially expert committee. 
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4.3 Further analysis 
To ensure rigorous results, we conduct several additional tests. Because the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012) recommends that an audit committee should be composed entirely 
of independent NEDs and a minimum of one financial expert to enhance its monitoring 
function, we replaced the variables of the percentages of independent NEDs and financial 
experts on the audit committee used in the logistic regression (shown in Table 4) with two 
dichotomous variables to capture the effects of the presence of a fully independent audit 
committee and the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee. We give a value of 
1 to both variables if the company has an audit committee composed entirely of independent 
non-executive directors or has at least one financial expert on its audit committee and 0 
otherwise. The results for the presence of a fully independent audit committee and the 
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presence of financial expertise on the audit committee indicate the same direction as the main 
findings reported in Table 4 and remain significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Further, we estimate the combined effects of the presence of a fully independent audit 
committee, the presence of financial expertise on the audit committee, and the ratio of 
auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees (FEERATIO) on the likelihood of 
going-concern modifications. Consistent with the main findings reported in Panel A of Table 
5, the interaction terms between FEERATIO and the presence of a fully independent audit 
committee and between FEERATIO and the presence of financial expertise on the audit 
committee are positively related to the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification. 
Additionally, in line with the findings presented in Panel B of Table 5, the results for the 
marginal effects show that there is a negative relationship between FEERATIO and the 
likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification when the audit committee is not 
composed entirely of independent NEDs or does not have at least one financial expert. By 
contrast, this relationship is not significant in the firms with an audit committee entirely 
composed of independent NEDs or with financial expertise on the audit committee. 
Some prior studies indicate that there is a substantial incentive for audit firms to act more 
favorably toward those audit clients that pay them a higher magnitude of NAS fees. If 
auditors receive lucrative NAS fees from a single audit client, they are more likely to provide 
a clean opinion to preserve their interests with respect to NAS (DeFond et al., 2002; 
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Basioudis et al., 2008). We replace the variable of the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to 
audit services fees (FEERATIO) employed in Table 4 with the natural log of auditor-provided 
NAS fees. The result shows that the natural log of auditor-provided NAS fees is also not 
significantly related to the likelihood of a going-concern modification. 
Then, we examine the combined effects of audit committee characteristics and the natural 
log of auditor-provided NAS fees on the likelihood of auditor going-concern modification. 
Consistent with our main findings shown in Table 5, the interaction terms between the 
percentages of independent NEDs on the audit committee, the percentage of financial experts 
on the audit committee, and the natural log of auditor-provided NAS fees are positively 
associated with the likelihood of a going-concern modification. Further, we also find that the 
relationship between the natural log of auditor-provided NAS fees and auditor reporting 
decisions varies in terms of the independence and financial expertise of the audit committee. 
The natural log of auditor-provided NAS fees has a significant positive association with the 
likelihood of auditor going-concern modification when the percentages of independent NEDs 
and financial experts on the audit committee are low (i.e. at the 25% percentile of the sample 
distribution of AC_INED and EXPERT). Those associations become insignificant when the 
independence and financial expertise of the audit committee are higher (i.e. at both the 50% 
and 75% percentiles of the sample distribution of AC_INED and EXPERT). Those results 
appear to be consistent with the reported findings in the main tests. 
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With regard to the control variables, we employ the variables of auditor switch and 
Z-score to replace TENURE and LOSS, respectively, shown in Tables 4 and 5. The presence 
of auditor switch is employed to control for audit opinion shopping. Prior literature argues 
that audit clients may shop around auditors looking for more favourable audit opinions 
(Craswell et al., 2002). We therefore expect the presence of an auditor switch to be negatively 
related to the likelihood of an auditor going-concern opinion. We give a value of 1 if the 
company switched its auditor up to three years prior to the year studied, and 0 otherwise. The 
Z-score is the probability-of-bankruptcy score developed by Taffler (1984), with a lower 
value indicating a higher probability of corporate failure (Agarwal & Taffler, 2007). It is 
expected that a firm with lower Z-score is more likely to receive an auditor going-concern 
opinion. The results show that the likelihood of going-concern modifications is not 
significantly related to the presence of auditor switch and Z-score. The significance of the 
other variables is substantively similar to the primary results reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
It is suggested that auditors may encounter higher pressure from the clients’ managers in 
the process of issuing a first-time going-concern opinion (Blay & Geiger, 2013). There were 
15 sample companies (13% of the total observations) which received a going-concern 
modification in the preceding year. We delete those observations and the variable, PRIOR, 
from the models, and re-run the analyses. The results of the models are essentially identical to 
those presented. In addition, since our sample period spans 13 years, the empirical results 
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may be driven by any particular year within the sample period (Geiger & Rama, 2006). Thus, 
we remove observations in each of our sample years and separately perform the analyses. 
Eliminating observations on a yearly basis for the respective sets of analyses produce results 
substantively the same as those reported. 
Finally, we re-perform the tests by using probit analysis. The results are essentially the 
same as those based on the logistic analysis presented in Tables 4 and 5.16
5. Conclusions 
 Overall, the results 
of the additional tests reinforce the importance of the audit committee with respect to auditor 
reporting quality and confirm the moderating effects of its independence and financial 
expertise on the threat posed by NAS. 
The recent invigorated debate over auditor reporting quality prior to corporate failure has 
often made reference to corporate governance structure and auditor-provided NAS fees. To 
address the concerns, corporate governance reformers have considered the audit committee as 
having a central role. The audit committee is charged to review and monitor the external 
auditor’s independence and objectivity, the effectiveness of the audit process and the value of 
auditor-provided NAS. According to the agency perspective, an audit committee with more 
independent directors and financial experts will work more effectively as members with such 
                                                     
16 We perform the lagrange multiplier test for the normality of the residuals of a probit model. The normality 
hypothesis of the residuals is not rejected in our probit models. 
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characteristics have the incentives and are more capable of overseeing the audit process and 
the purchase of auditor-provided NAS. 
The present research provides new evidence on whether the issuing by auditors of a 
standard unmodified opinion for companies subsequently failing is related to the 
independence and financial expertise of the audit committee and auditor provision of NAS. 
Specifically, we examined whether the threat posed by NAS to auditor reporting quality is 
mediated by the independence and financial expertise of the audit committee. 
In line with prior studies, only 34% of UK failed companies in our sample received 
going-concern modifications immediately prior to failure. The empirical results generated 
from univariate and logistic analyses suggest that the percentages of independent NEDs and 
financial experts on the audit committee are positively related to the likelihood of an auditor 
going-concern modification. However, there is no significant association between 
auditor-provided NAS fees and the likelihood of an auditor going-concern modification. We 
further find that the effect of auditor-provided NAS on auditor reporting decisions is 
mediated by the audit committee characteristics. The interaction terms between 
auditor-provided NAS fees and the percentages of independent NEDs and financial experts 
on the audit committee are positively related to the likelihood of a going-concern 
modification. Auditor-provided NAS are less likely to be associated with the issuance of a 
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standard unmodified opinion prior to failure when the audit committee is composed of more 
independent NEDs and financial experts, which is consistent with the agency perspective. 
The findings of this study suggest implications for the corporate governance literature and 
corporate governance policy. Overall, the findings support the logic of the agency perspective 
in this domain and corporate governance regulators’ concerns about the importance of the 
independence and financial expertise of an audit committee. Specifically, this study provides 
evidence that the link between the provision of NAS and auditor reporting quality is mediated 
by the independence and financial expertise of the audit committee, suggesting the 
importance of audit committee characteristics in relation to a company’s decisions on 
purchasing NAS. 
Although the results of this research are important, they must be interpreted in the light of 
the following limitations. First, as in the case of earlier relevant research studying the setting 
of corporate failure, the number of observations employed in our empirical analysis is 
relatively small.17
                                                     
17 As we noted earlier, we find in our UK-based study that relatively few large-scale companies have been 
subject to failure, consistent with the prior relevant study by Citron and Taffler (1992) that employed 107 failed 
companies between 1977-1986. Similarly, there were 89,134,134 and 92 failed companies in the relevant U.S. 
studies by Menon and Schwartz (1987), McKeown et al. (1991), Hopwood et al. (1994) and Callaghan et al. 
(2009), respectively. 
 However, the sample selection procedures captured all the relevant firms 
with respect to the research questions in that this research investigates the entire population of 
the UK non-financial failed firms with an audit committee between 1997 and 2010. Thus, the 
possible limitation in relation to the size of observation would be minimal in this setting (see 
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Sharma & Sidhu, 2001; Callaghan, Parkash, & Singhal, 2009). Second, due to availability of 
data, this research focuses only on the structural characteristics of the audit committee. 
Further studies can adopt survey or in-depth interview to explore how an audit committee 
interacts with both auditors and management to enhance understanding of the effectiveness of 
the audit committee in terms of auditor reporting quality. Third, it is important to realise that 
all NAS fees are paid for particular services rendered. The Smith Report (2003) suggests that 
whether the provision of NAS is a threat to auditor independence depends on the nature of 
each particular case. However, further identification of different types of NAS is limited by 
the respective procedures for public filing adopted by each company, which may be taken as 
a criticism of those procedures. Future research could usefully explore the relationships 
identified in this study in greater depth through more detailed classification of NAS. 
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Table 1  
The Characteristics of Failed Sample Firms 
Panel A: Number of the sample companies 
 Panel B: Distribution of the FTSE industrial classification of 
the sample companies 
Delisting 
year  Frequency  Percentage  Industrial Classifications  Frequency  Percentage 
1997  4  3%  Basic Materials  8  7% 
1998  7  6%  Industrials  30  26% 
1999  11  10%  Consumer Goods  21  18% 
2000  11  10%  Health Care  6  5% 
2001  15  13%  Consumer Services  27  23% 
2002  22  19%  Telecommunications  6  5% 
2003  11  10%  Utilities  2  2% 
2004  6  5%  Technology  16  14% 
2005  6  5%       
2006  3  2%       
2007  0  0%       
2008  6  5%       
2009  9  8%       
2010  5  4%       
Total  116  100%  Total  116  100% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis  
Variables 
 Going-concern Modifications  (n = 39)(4)  
Clean Opinions 
 (n = 77)  
   
    
 Mean Median Std dev  Mean Median Std dev  
T-test/ 
Chi-square (3) 
 Mann- 
Whitney  
AC_INED  76.50  100 31.87   64.63  66.67  35.69   -1.75 **  -1.83 * 
EXPERT  50.00 50.00 25.58  30.02 33.33 27.60  -3.77 ***  -3.41 *** 
FEERATIO  1.72  1.01 2.12   1.87  1.00  2.47   0.33   0.64  
AC_SIZ  2.62  3.00 0.67   2.83  3.00  0.70   1.59   1.62  
REPORTLAG  133.28 122 39.18  101.52 99 34.48  -4.48 ***  -4.08 *** 
TENURE  5.72 6.00 3.04  6.22 6.00 2.88  0.87   0.81  
BIGN  0.74  0.44  0.75  0.43  0.01     
COM_SIZ (million)  78.40 33.60 125.91   129.83  41.53  215.26   1.38   1.68 * 
COMPLEX  21.84 12.5 27.92  24.77 20 27.54  0.53   0.48  
LOSS  0.82    0.53    9.21 ***    
LEV  0.41 0.33 0.48  0.29 0.29 0.22  -1.86 *  -1.25  
PRIOR  0.36  0.49  0.01  0.11  27.52 ***    
CRISIS  0.15    0.17    0.14     
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1% (p < 0.01), at the 5% (p < 0.05) and at the 10% (p < 0.10) 
levels, respectively. (2) AC_INED: the percentage of audit committee members who are independent directors; 
EXPERT: the percentage of members with financial expertise on the audit committee; FEERATIO: the ratio of 
auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees; AC_SIZ: number of audit committee members; REPORTLAG: 
number of days from the end of the year to the audit report date; TENURE: length of auditor-client relationship 
in years; BIGN: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company was audited by a Big 4/5 audit firm, 0 
otherwise; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets (proxy for firm size); COMPLEX: the percentage of foreign 
subsidiaries in total subsidiaries; LOSS: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company reported negative 
net income for the fiscal year, 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of total debt to total assets; PRIOR: a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if the company received a going-concern modification in the preceding year, 0 otherwise; 
CRISIS: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the last audit opinion date prior to failure was after 31 December 
2007, 0 otherwise. (3) T-tests and Mann-Whitney tests for continuous variables; and chi-square tests for 
categorical variables (SWITCH, BIGN, LOSS, PRIOR and CRISIS). (4) Among the 39 companies which were 
issued with an auditor going-concern modification, 2 received a qualified opinion and 37 received an emphasis 
of matter paragraph highlighting the existence of material going-concern uncertainty. 
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Table 3 
Spearman correlation matrix  
 
    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13 
1 AC_INED 0.37  *** 1.00                        
2 EXPERT 0.07   0.12   1.00                      
3 FEERATIO 0.17  * 0.19  ** -0.11   1.00                    
4 AC_SIZ -0.14   -0.26  *** -0.24  *** -0.07   1.00                  
5 REPORTLAG -0.14   -0.01   -0.06   -0.06   -0.18  * 1.00                
6 TENURE 0.21  ** 0.19  ** -0.08   0.18  * -0.16  * 0.03   1.00              
7 BIGN 0.13   -0.02   -0.12   0.12   0.08   -0.02   0.06   1.00            
8 LnCOM_SIZ 0.16  * 0.15   0.01   0.18  * 0.11   -0.27  *** 0.20  ** 0.14   1.00          
9 COMPLEX -0.02   0.08   -0.09   0.05   -0.04   0.02   0.05   0.12   0.38  *** 1.00        
10 LOSS -0.06   0.06   -0.04   0.07   -0.05   0.26  *** -0.01   0.01   -0.35  *** -0.05   1.00     
11 LEV -0.04   0.06   0.11   0.03   -0.10   0.18  * 0.09   0.05   0.29  *** 0.08   -0.19  *** 1.00   
12 PRIOR -0.07   0.10   0.18  ** 0.03   -0.10   0.17  * 0.00   0.04   -0.10   -0.07   -0.15  ** -0.02   1.00  
13 CRISIS -0.04    0.07    0.17  * -0.05    -0.01    -0.18  ** 0.07    0.05    0.34  *** 0.17  * 0.12  * -0.12    -0.04  
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate a significant relationship at the 1% (p < 0.01), 5% (p < 0.05) and 10% (p < 0.10) levels, respectively. (2) AC_INED: the percentage of audit 
committee members who are independent directors; EXPERT: the percentage of members with financial expertise on the audit committee; FEERATIO: the ratio of 
auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees; AC_SIZ: number of audit committee members; REPORTLAG: number of days from the end of the year to the audit report 
date; TENURE: length of auditor-client relationship in years; BIGN: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company was audited by a Big 4/5 audit firm, 0 otherwise; 
LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets (proxy for firm size); COMPLEX: the percentage of foreign subsidiaries in total subsidiaries; LOSS: a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 if the company reported negative net income for the fiscal year, 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of total debt to total assets; PRIOR: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
company received a going-concern modification in the preceding year, 0 otherwise. CRISIS: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the last audit opinion date prior to failure 
was after 31 December 2007, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Logistic regression of the associations of audit committee characteristics and non-audit 
services (NAS) fees with the likelihood of going-concern modifications 
GCM = β0 +β1AC_INEDi + β2EXPERTi + β3FEERATIOi + β4AC_SIZi + β5REPORTLAGi + β6TENUREi 
+β7BIGNi + β8LnCOM_SIZi + β9COMPLEXi + β10LOSSi + β11LEVi +β12PRIORi + β13CRISISi + ei    
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
AC_INED  0.019**  0.017***  0.020** 
  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
EXPERT  0.040**  0.039***  0.040** 
  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
FEERATIO  -0.167  0.071  -0.157 
  (0.197)  (0.123)  (0.208) 
AC_SIZ  -0.062  0.116  -0.084 
  (0.499)  (0.424)  (0.492) 
REPORTLAG  0.025***  0.026***  0.025*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
TENURE  -0.108  -0.085  -0.126 
  (0.104)  (0.088)  (0.103) 
BIGN  -0.171  0.230  -0.125 
  (0.682)  (0.631)  (0.690) 
LnCOM_SIZ  0.040  -0.231  0.092 
  (0.256)  (0.246)  (0.259) 
COMPLEX  0.004  0.004  0.003 
  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
LOSS  3.088***  1.467**  3.045*** 
  (0.752)  (0.593)  (0.725) 
LEV  0.781  1.288**  0.758 
  (0.869)  (0.553)  (0.918) 
PRIOR  4.760***    4.646*** 
  (1.504)    (1.462) 
CRISIS  0.501  0.230   
  (0.779)  (0.622)   
Constant  -8.995***  -7.447***  -8.900*** 
  (3.279)  (2.647)  (3.213) 
       
Observations  116  116  116 
Model chi-square  29.76***  29.54***  29.48*** 
Pseudo R-square  0.4931  0.3425  0.4909 
       
Classification rate (%)       
Going-concern modifications  74.36  66.67  79.49 
Clean opinions  90.91  88.31  92.21 
Overall  85.34  81.03  87.93 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate a significant relationship at the 1% (p < 0.01), 5% (p < 0.05) and 10% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) AC_INED: the percentage of audit committee 
members who are independent directors; EXPERT: the percentage of members with financial expertise on the 
audit committee; FEERATIO: the ratio of auditor-provided NAS fees to audit services fees; AC_SIZ: number of 
audit committee members; REPORTLAG: number of days from the end of the year to the audit report date; 
TENURE: length of auditor-client relationship in years; BIGN: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
company was audited by a Big 4/5 audit firm, 0 otherwise; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets (proxy for 
firm size); COMPLEX: the percentage of foreign subsidiaries in total subsidiaries; LOSS: a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if the company reported negative net income for the fiscal year, 0 otherwise; LEV: the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; PRIOR: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company received a going-concern 
modification in the preceding year, 0 otherwise. CRISIS: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the last audit 
opinion date prior to failure was after 31 December 2007, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Results for interactive effects of audit committee characteristics and non-audit services (NAS) 
fees on the likelihood of going-concern opinions 
Panel A: Logistic regression 
GCM = β0 +β1AC_INEDi + β2EXPERTi + β3FEERATIOi + β4FEERATIO*AC_NEDi + β5FEERATIO*AC_INEDi 
+ β6FEERATIO*EXPERTi + β7AC_SIZi + β8REPORTLAGi + β9TENUREi + β10BIGNi + β11LnCOM_SIZi 
+ β12COMPLEXi + β13LOSSi + β14LEVi +β15PRIORi + β16CRISISi + ei    
Variables   (1)  (2) 
AC_INED   0.041**  0.016* 
   (0.018)  (0.009) 
EXPERT   0.036**  0.056*** 
   (0.016)  (0.015) 
FEERATIO   -0.807*  -0.373 
   (0.401)  (0.245) 
FEERATIO* AC_INED   0.025**   
   (0.013)   
FEERATIO*EXPERT     0.027** 
     (0.011) 
AC_SIZ   0.014  -0.075 
   (0.524)  (0.527) 
REPORTLAG   0.024***  0.026*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
TENURE   -0.105  -0.086 
   (0.108)  (0.114) 
BIGN   -0.255  -0.069 
   (0.734)  (0.765) 
LnCOM_SIZ   0.075  -0.040 
   (0.270)  (0.292) 
COMPLEX   0.005  0.006 
   (0.012)  (0.014) 
LOSS   3.132***  3.494*** 
   (0.706)  (0.939) 
LEV   0.910  0.456 
   (0.971)  (0.975) 
PRIOR   4.539***  6.022*** 
   (1.525)  (1.096) 
CRISIS   0.492  0.458 
   (0.821)  (0.869) 
CONSTANT   -7.403***  -6.908*** 
   (2.421)  (2.478) 
      
Observations   116  116 
Model chi-square   39.40***  56.90*** 
Pseudo R-square   0.5154  0.5314 
Classification rate (%)      
Going-concern modifications   76.92  76.92 
Clean opinions   92.21  88.31 
Overall   87.07  84.48 
Panel B: Coefficient on (FEERATIO + FEERATIO*AC_NED), (FEERATIO+ FEERATIO*AC_INED), 
(FEERATIO + FEERATIO*EXPERT), by different values of AC_NED, AC_INED and EXPERT, 
respectively. 
Sample Distribution  AC_INED  EXPERT   
25% percentiles  at 50% -1.284** at 0% -1.348** 
   (0.617)  (0.533) 
50% percentiles  at 66.67% -0.856** at 33.33% -0.463* 
   (0.422)  (0.260) 
75% percentiles  at 100% -0.010 at 50% -0.021 
   (0.236)  (0.232) 
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Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate a significant relationship at the 1% (p < 0.01), 5% (p < 0.05) and 10% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) Panel A shows the logistic regression for the effect of 
the interaction terms between AC_IND, EXPERT and FEERATIO on the likelihood of a going-concern 
modification. AC_INED, EXPERT and FEERATIO have been mean-centred. FEERATIO*AC_NED: the 
interaction term between FEERATIO and AC_NED; FEERATIO*AC_INED: the interaction term between 
FEERATIO and AC_INED; FEERATIO*EXPERT: the interaction term between FERATIO and EXPERT. See 
Table 3 for definitions of the other variables. (3) Panel B shows how the impact of FEERATIO on the likelihood 
of a going-concern modification varies with different values of AC_NED, AC_INED and EXPERT. (4) The 
models shown in this table are developed by extending Model (1) of Table 4. The results are substantively the 
same after the deletion of PRIOR and CRISIS as Models (2) and (3) shown in Table 4, respectively. 
 
 
